

Message Text

SECRET

PAGE 01 MBFR V 00009 01 OF 02 291557Z

43

ACTION ACDA-19

INFO OCT-01 EUR-25 IO-14 ISO-00 ACDE-00 CIAE-00 PM-07

INR-10 L-03 NSAE-00 PA-04 RSC-01 PRS-01 SP-03 USIA-15

TRSE-00 SAJ-01 SS-20 NSC-07 AEC-11 AECE-00 OIC-04

OMB-01 SAM-01 DRC-01 CU-04 /153 W

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P R 291313Z MAY 74

FM USDEL MBFR VIENNA

TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 0008

SECDEF WASHDC PRIORITY

INFO USMISSION NATO

AMEMBASSY BONN

AMEMBASSY LONDON

USMISSION GENEVA

USNMR SHAPE

RUSNAAA USCINCEUR

S E C R E T SECTION 1 OF 2 MBFR VIENNA 0009

FROM US REP MBFR

GENEVA FOR CSCE DELEGATION

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: PARM, NATO

SUBJECT: MBFR: DISCUSSION WITH SOVIET REPS,

MAY 27, 1974

1. BEGIN SUMMARY: ON INVITATION OF US REP, RECIPROCATING SOVIET INITIATIVE OF MAY 13, US REP AND DEPREP HAD INFORMAL DISCUSSION ON MAY 27 WITH SOVIET REPS KHLESTOV AND SMIRNOVSKY. TONE WAS CORDIAL. SOVIET REPS SAID THEY CONSIDERED THAT IN PRESENTING NON-INCREASE PROPOSAL IN INFORMAL SESSION OF MAY 22, ALLIES HAD DEMONSTRATED DESIRE TO SOLVE PROBLEM OF WHOSE FORCES SHOULD BE REDUCED FORM THE OUTSET. BUT THEY INSISTED THAT OFFICIAL AND PUBLIC OPINION IN USSR AND

SECRET

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PAGE 02 MBFR V 00009 01 OF 02 291557Z

EASTERN EUROPE WOULD NOT UNDERSTAND IT IF WESTERN EUROPEANS,

PARTICULARLY BUNDESWEHR FORCES, WERE NOT REDUCED IN A FIRST ROUND. SOVIET REPS INDIGNANTLY REJECTED AS WHOLLY INCORRECT REPORTS THAT SOVIET OFFICIALS ELSEWHERE WERE INDICATING THAT SOVIETS WISHED TO PAUSE IN VIENNA NEGOTIATIONS FOR SAKE OF CSCE OR TO REVIEW RECENT POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS AND CHANGES IN WESTERN GOVERNMENTS.

2. SOVIET REPS CRITICIZED ALLIED PROPOSAL FOR NO-INCREASE COMMITMENT ON GROUNDS THAT IT DID NOT EXTEND TO FREEZE ON ARMAMENTS, WHICH THEY CLAIMED NATO PLANNED TO INCREASE IN FORESEEABLE FUTURE, AND THAT IT IMPOSED UNEQUAL OBLIGATIONS ON DIRECT PARTICIPANTS, REQUIRING THE USSR TO REDUCE WHILE OTHERS MERELY COMMITTED THEMSELVES NOT TO EXCEED FORCE LEVELS. END SUMMARY.

3. KHLESTOV BEGAN DISCUSSION BY REFERRING TO ALLIED ASSERTIONS IN APRIL 8 AND MAY 22 INFORMAL SESSIONS THAT PERSONNEL OF WARSAW PACT HELICOPTER UNITS ASSIGNED TO GROUND SUPPORT MISSION WERE AIR FORCE RATHER THAN GROUND FORCES. KHLESTOV SAID HE HAD CHECKED INTO THIS COMMENT AND HAD FOUND THAT AS REGARDS HELICOPTER PERSONNEL IN THE AREA OF REDUCTIONS, THESE WERE IN THE "ARMY AVIATION" AND SHOULD BE CONSIDERED AS GROUND FORCES. KHLESTOV'S LANGUAGE PERMITTED INTERPRETATION THAT THIS WAS NOT UNIVERSALLY THE CASE WITH SOVIET ARMED FORCES, BUT WAS SO WITHIN THE AREA OF REDUCTIONS.

4. US REP SAID HE WOULD BE INTERESTED IN SOVIET REACTION TO ALLIED SUGGESTION OF A NO-INCREASE COMMITMENT TO COVER THE PERIOD BETWEEN PHASES. US CONSIDERED THIS AN IMPORTANT MOVE AND EXPECTED A MOVE OF EQUIVALENT IMPORTANCE FROM SOVIETS.

5. KHLESTOV STARTED OFF BY SAYING THAT THIS MOVE WAS NOT SUCH A BIG THING AND WHY WERE THE ALLIES ATTACHING IMPORTANCE TO IT, BUT HE RAPIDLY SHIFTED HIS APPROACH TO BECOME SOMEWHAT MORE POSITIVE. AT KHLESTOV'S SIGNAL, SMIRNOVSKY ASKED WHY THE NO-INCREASE COMMITMENT DID NOT COVER ARMAMENTS. US REP SAID MANPOWER WAS THE FOCAL ELEMENT OF MILITARY STRENGTH AND
SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 03 MBFR V 00009 01 OF 02 291557Z

THE PERIOD WAS A LIMITED ONE. ALLIED REDUCTION PROPOSAL FOCUSED ON GROUND FORCE MANPOWER. THIS WAS WHY THE HAD LIMITED THEIR NO-INCREASE PROPOSAL TO GROUND FORCE MANPOWER TOO. THIS WAS THE MOST IMPORTANT ELEMENT IN MILITARY STRENGTH AND WAS THE FOCAL ELEMENT TO CONTROL.

6. SMIRNOVSKY SAID THAT, AS FAR AS SOVIETS WERE INFORMED, NONE OF THE OTHER WESTERN DIRECT PARTICIPANTS HAD PLANS

TO INCREASE THE MANPOWER OF THEIR GROUND FORCES IN THE FORESEEABLE FUTURE. ON THE OTHER HAND, MANY OF THEM HAD ALREADY ANNOUNCED PLANS TO INCREASE THEIR ARMAMENTS, SUCH AS TANKS. MOREOVER, SUCH AN ARRANGEMENT WOULD BE INEQUITABLE SINCE THE SOVIETS WOULD BE EXPECTED TO WITHDRAW TANKS UNDER THE WESTERN PHASE I PROPOSAL WHEREAS THE OTHER WESTERN PARTICIPANTS WOULD BE FREE TO INCREASE THEIRS.

7. KHESTOV INTERJECTED THAT THIS INEQUALITY OF TREATMENT WAS A MAJOR DIFFICULTY FOR THE SOVIETS WITH REGARD TO INCREASE POSSIBILITY AND PHASING GENERALLY. BY AGREEMENT, ALL DIRECT PARTICIPANTS HAD EQUAL STATUS AS REGARDS THEIR FORCES WITHIN THE REDUCTION AREA. UNDER THE ALLIED PROPOSAL, HOWEVER, THE SOVIET UNION WOULD HAVE TO REDUCE ITS FORCES, WHEREAS OTHER WESTERN EUROPEAN DIRECT PARTICIPANTS WOULD MERELY COMMIT THEMSELVES NOT TO EXCEED AN AGREED FORCE LEVEL. THIS WOULD PLACE THE SOVIET UNION IN A DISADVANTAGED AND UNEQUAL POSITION. MOREOVER, THE ALLIES ENVISAGED A GLOBAL CEILING FOR EACH SIDE WHICH WOULD EVEN PERMIT SOME FORCES SUCH AS THE GERMANS TO INCREASE WHILE AN INDIVIDUAL LIMITATION WOULD BE PLACED ON SOVIET FORCES. SOVIET AUTHORITIES IN MOSCOW DID NOT SEE ANY REASON WHATEVER WHY THE SOVIET UNION SHOULD RECEIVE WORSE TREATMENT THAN OTHER DIRECT PARTICIPANTS. THIS WAS A MAJOR MOTIVATION FOR THE INSISTANCE OF SOVIET AUTHORITIES THAT ALL FORCES

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PAGE 01 MBFR V 00009 02 OF 02 291533Z

43

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USNMR SHAPE
USCINCEUR

S E C R E T SECTION 2 OF 2 MBFR VIENNA 0009

FROM US REP MBFR

GENEVA FOR CSCE DELEGATION

BE REDUCED FROM THE OUTSET.

8. US REP EXPLAINED THAT THE INEQUALITY WAS THE OTHER WAY AROUND EVEN THOUGH UNAVOIDABLE: THE US AND USSR WOULD REDUCE ONLY A PORTION OF THEIR FORCES, WHEREAS MOST OF THE OTHER WESTERN DIRECT PARTICIPANTS WOULD BE PLACING THEIR ENTIRE TERRITORIES UNDER THE TERMS OF THE AGREEMENT. MOREOVER, THERE WAS A DIFFERENCE BETWEEN WITHDRAWAL AND REDUCTION. A FIRST PHASE AGREEMENT WOULD MEAN ONLY THAT THE SOVIET UNION WOULD MOVE 15 PERCENT OF ITS GROUND FORCES 400 MILES. FOR MOST OF THE WESTERN DIRECT PARTICIPANTS IT WOULD MEAN PLACING THEIR ENTIRE TERRITORIES UNDER THE TERMS OF
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PAGE 02 MBFR V 00009 02 OF 02 291533Z

THE AGREEMENT. IT WAS THE LATTER GROUP, NOT THE USSR, WHOSE MEMBERS WOULD RECEIVE DIFFERENT TREATMENT. THIS JUSTIFIED THEIR DESIRE THAT THE SOVIET UNION AND THE UNITED STATES TAKE THE FIRST STEP TO DEMONSTRATE THE CREDIBILITY OF THE MUTUAL REDUCTION CONCEPT. THE US UNDERSTOOD AND SUPPORTED THIS VIEW. IT WAS A POLITICAL FACT WHICH HAD TO BE TAKEN INTO ACCOUNT.

9. KHLESTOV INSISTED THAT SOVIET POLITICAL LEADERS WOULD NOT UNDERSTAND IT IF THE SOVIET UNION WAS NOT GIVEN EQUAL TREATMENT WITH REMAINING DIRECT PARTICIPANTS. AFTER ALL, ALL PARTICIPANTS HAD AGREED TO LIMIT THE NEGOTIATIONS TO CENTRAL EUROPE, ACTING IN THE FULL KNOWLEDGE THAT THERE WERE OTHER IMPORTANT FORCES OUTSIDE THE AREA. THEY HAD NOT AGREED TO TRY TO MAKE A WORLDWIDE MUTUAL FORCE REDUCTION. THEREFORE, HAVING SELECTED AN AREA, ALL COUNTRIES WITH FORCES WITHIN IT SHOULD BE TREATED EQUALLY. HE WAS NOT IMPRESSED BY ARGUMENTS ABOUT THE FEARS AND CONCERNS OF THE WESTERN EUROPEANS WHICH CAUSED THEM TO WISH PRIOR US AND SOVIET REDUCTIONS. AFTER AN AGREEMENT, THE US WOULD STILL HAVE A CONSIDERABLE NUMBER OF TROOPS IN EUROPE AND DID NOT INTEND TO TAKE AWAY THE REMAINDER.

IN THE EVENT OF REAL EMERGENCY, THE WESTERN EUROPEANS KNEW THAT THE UNITED STATES WOULD COME TO THEIR ASSISTANCE WITH ALL ITS MILITARY RESOURCES, JUST AS WOULD THE SOVIET UNION. HENCE, WESTERN EUROPEAN CONCERNS WERE EXAGGERATED.

10. US REP NOTED THAT KHLESTOV HAD JUST SUBSTANTIATED THE WESTERN ARGUMENTS ON GEOGRAPHIC DISPARITIES. KHLESTOV COMMENTED THAT, IN ADDITION, WEST WAS INSISTING ON EASTERN ACCEPTANCE OF COMMON CEILING AS A PRE-CONDITION FOR A SOLUTION OF PHASING. US REP SAID THIS WAS NOT THE CASE. ALLIED REPS HAD REMINDED EASTERN REPS THAT COMMON CEILING WAS AN INTEGRAL PART OF THE ALLIED REDUCTION PROGRAM WHICH WOULD HAVE TO BE DEALT WITH LATER ON. UBT ALL BOTH SIDES WERE SEEKING NOW WAS A TENTATIVE SOLUTION OF THE QUESTION OF WHOSE FORCES SHOULD BE REDUCED FROM THE OUTSET. WHETHER SUCH A SOLUTION WOULD BE CONFIRMED WOULD, AS NORMAL IN NEGOTIATIONS OF THIS TYPE, DEPEND ON THE POSITION OF BOTH SIDES WITH RESPECT TO THE REMAINING ASPECTS OF AN AGREEMENT.

SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 03 MBFR V 00009 02 OF 02 291533Z

11. KHLESTOV SAID THIS EXPLANATION WAS HELPFUL AND AGAIN ACKNOWLEDGED THAT THE ALLIES HAD MADE SOME EFFORT IN PRESENTING THIS POSSIBILITY. HOWEVER, FOR THE EAST, THERE WAS A FUNDAMENTAL DIFFERENCE BETWEEN FREEZING AND REDUCTIONS AND ALL DIRECT PARTICIPANTS SHOULD CROSS THAT THRESHOLD. THE SOVIETS UNDERSTOOD THE PSYCHOLOGICAL RESERVATIONS ON THE PART OF THE ALLIES. BUT WEST WOULD HAVE TO RECOGNIZE THAT PSYCHOLOGICAL FACTORS PLAYED A MAJOR ROLE ON THE SOVIET SIDE ALSO.

12. US REP REPEATED THAT HE SAW NO OTHER WAY WHATEVER TO WESTERN EUROPEAN REDUCTIONS THAN THROUGH AN INITIAL US-SOVIET REDUCTION PHASE. THIS WAS A POLITICAL FACT WHICH THE SOVIETS SHOULD TAKE INTO ACCOUNT.

13. US REP SAID HE HAD NOTED A LARGE NUMBER OF REPORTS FROM SOVIET UNION AND WARSAW PACT REPRESENTATIVES BOTH IN VIENNA AND OUTSIDE, TO THE EFFECT THAT THE WARSAW PACT DID NOT WISH TO MOVE ON THE VIENNA NEGOTIATIONS UNTIL THERE WAS MOVEMENT IN CSCE OR UNTIL THE PACT COMPLETED AN EVALUATION OF RECENT POLITICAL CHANGES IN THE WEST.

14. KHLESTOV REACTED VEHEMENTLY TO THIS REMARK. HE DECLARED IT WAS IMPOSSIBLE THAT ANY AUTHORIZED SOVIET REPRESENTATIVE COULD HAVE CREATED AN IMPRESSION OF THIS KIND BECAUSE THIS WOULD HAVE BEEN A DIRECT CONTRAVENTION OF OFFICIAL EXPLICIT SOVIET INSTRUCTIONS. ALLEGATIONS THAT THE SOVIETS WISHED TO HOLD BACK IN VIENNA NOW WERE SIMPLY INCORRECT. SINCE THEY WERE INCORRECT, THEY MUST

BE FABRICATED BY THOSE WHO DESIRED NO GOOD TO THE PRESENT
NEGOTIATIONS.RESOR

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